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Abstract 
 
The paper presents a decomposition of productivity gap between South-Korea and 
Estonia for the year 2006. After presenting stylised facts related to income conver-
gence, we apply shift-share analysis to explain the patterns of structural disparities 
both at aggregated sectoral level and within the manufacturing sector. We propose 
an extension to conventional shift-share analysis with using relative productivity indi-
cators. Decomposition shows that the overall productivity gap is mainly related to the 
manufacturing sector. The results show that at sectoral view, discrepancies in 
productivity levels of individual sectors (within-effect) play the dominant role in 
productivity gap formation, whereas we find some support for the structural-bonus 
hypothesis within the manufacturing sector. In line with the previous studies, relative-
ly high productivity in financial intermediation and real estate sector as a feature of 
young market economies was confirmed. 
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Introduction 
 
Estonia and the Republic of Korea (or South Korea) are both in a similar situation in 
terms of future economic challenges – there is a need to close the development gap 
between them and the world's richest. Both countries have so far been quite suc-
cessful in this respect, though Korea has gained a considerable head start compared 
to Estonia since it began that chase more than a decade earlier1. Statistics reveal 
that over the past decade the two countries have been able to significantly reduce 
their backlog from the average per capita gross national income (GNI) of OECD 
countries (Figure 1). In 2002 the GNI of Estonia and Korea were 45% and 76% from 
OECD average respectively, whereas by the year 2011 the corresponding figures 
had been increased to 58% and 87% – an increase of 13 and 11 percentage points. 
It is noticeable that the race of catching up is taking place in somewhat different race 
classes as Estonia is currently trying to reach to a level where Korea was already a 
decade ago. However, the statistical ratios reveal that some convergence has oc-
curred – the level of Estonian gross national income relative to Korea has risen from 
59% to 67%. In absolute figures, net national income per person was 26425 USD in 
Korea and 17616 USD in Estonia (in PPP terms) in 2011. 
 
However, the figure 1 shows that the process of convergence has been far from mo-
notonous and unified nature as the global economic downturn in 2009-2010 has 
caused a recession only in Estonia but not in Korea. Estonia was thriving during the 
economic boom in 2004-2007 and reached as close to Korea as the latter is com-
pared to the OECD average, the subsequent economic crisis, however, had in princi-
ple thrown the whole process some five years back. Moreover, the quicker growth in 
Estonia and the process of continuing convergence is not certain or guaranteed. Dur-
                                                 
1
 In some sense, the period of centrally planned economy in Estonia can be seen as a failed attempt 
to find an alternative option for accelerating the economic growth. Unfortunately, undervaluation or 
ignorance of market signals resulted in a dead end. 
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ing the particular period, the average absolute increment of gross national income 
per capita was 881 USD in OECD, 1033 USD in Korea and only 844 USD per year in 
Estonia. If this tendency continues, income disparities will further increase. 
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Figure 1. Income convergence in Estonia and Korea 2002 to 2011.  
Source: OECD 
 
 
In this paper we will focus on one specific aspect of convergence process and exam-
ine the structural determinants of the productivity gap between Korea and Estonia. In 
other words, the goal is to explain the patterns of structural transformation and de-
compose the productivity gap between Estonia and Korea both at the national level 
and in manufacturing sector in particular. 
 
Productivity differences between countries can be decomposed into three separated 
effects. One of which is characterising the differences in allocation of labour between 
industries (the between-effect), the second measures the productivity growth caused 
by intra-branch productivity growth (within-effect) and the third component represent 
a cross (covariance) effect of both structural and productivity differences, that is posi-
tive when industries with growing labour productivity are increasing their market 
share. In addition to the aggregated components, the contribution of individual sec-
tors is also of interest. The data used in this paper is from the OECD Database for 
Structural Analysis (STAN). The calculations of the analysis are based on the data 
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from the year 2006. The novelty in methodology lies in a spatial comparison and the 
application of relative productivity indicators in explaining the productivity gap. 
 
Spatial analysis of productivity gap is not widely used in the literature. Rodrik 
(2012:38) is one of the few who has applied productivity decomposition analysis for 
explaining regional productivity differences. In his research, he comes to the conclu-
sion that unification of employment structure of China and India with developed in-
dustrial countries would result in productivity increase of three and two times respec-
tively. The decomposition of aggregate productivity has been also used in explaining 
the productivity gap between Australia and New-Zealand, whereas contributions of 
individual sectors were calculated (Yang, Stephenson 2011). Similar decomposition 
was applied in our earlier work (Sepp, Eerma 2009) where we found the components 
of manufacturing sector productivity gap between Estonia and Ireland or Finland, as 
well as between the EU-average. However, Rodrik's own fundamental interest is re-
lated to the decomposition of productivity dynamics of countries or regions. In con-
trast to the typical approach of focusing on the specific country2, Rodrik raises the 
question of the fundamental roots of the international variation of productivity compo-
nents. His motivation for this type of analysis lies in the peculiar patterns of productiv-
ity components of Asia, South-America and Africa. Havlik (2013), de Vries et al 
(2012) and Chansomphou, Ichihashi (2013) represent the other examples of large-
scale cross-national comparisons of productivity decomposition in transition econo-
mies, however with the focus towards the BRIC countries. 
 
The transformation patterns of sectoral structure of the economy have been studied 
both empirically using stylized facts, as well in the framework of growth theory.3 In 
general, the economic structure is considered as a determinant of productivity and 
thereby the influencing factor of economic welfare. Timmer, Szirmai (2000) and sev-
eral follow-up papers are talking about the structural bonus hypothesis. It should be 
emphasized, however, that there is definitely a two-way causality. A rather classic 
and generally accepted notion is that tertiarization and rising share of service sector 
employment in the developed countries could be largely denoted to the consequence 
                                                 
2
 Particularly on the structural changes in manufacturing industry the relevant research has been done 
by Marczewski, Szczygielski (2007) in the Polish, by O’Donnell (2007) in the Irish, by Szalavetz (2009) 
in the Hungarian and by Akkemik (2006) in the Turkish manufacturing experience.  
3
 Fisher (1935), Clark (1940); Fourastié (1949), Kaldor (1961), Baumol (1967); Fuchs (1968), Kuznets 
(1971) and Madisson (1980) are the classics in this sphere. 
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of the increased productivity of the manufacturing sector. It enables and generates 
both the growth in demand for services as well as releases labour for service sector, 
where in many branches the “internal” productivity growth opportunities are relatively 
limited. 
 
In developing countries, the released labour may be exploited in low-productivity ag-
riculture or even in black economy. In this case, the impact of structural transfor-
mation on the overall productivity is negative (de Vries et al. 2011, Rodrik 2011). 
Therefore, in this paper we pay special attention to the links between employment 
and productivity. If this link is negative, the structural burden occurs - employment 
shift away from relatively progressive industries towards those with lower growth of 
labour productivity (Baumol 1967). In the opposite case, if the positive relation 
emerges, there is a specialization in economy as the labour shifts from low to high 
productivity sectors, which amplifies the average productivity growth (structural bo-
nus). In the latter case, to a certain extent we can also refer to the process of smart 
specialization. Previous studies have not, however, given an unambiguous justifica-
tion for those linkages between productivity and employment shifts4. Rodrik (2012: 
40) for instance believes that the explanation lies in the country-specific effects of 
globalization that depend on the framework conditions of each particular country e.g. 
the local policy and development strategies. McMillan et al (2011) emphasize the in-
tensity of import competition, availability of natural resources, over-regulated labour 
market and the overvalued currency as the main barriers for productivity enhancing 
transformations. In this paper, we investigate and control the previous results with 
comparing Estonia and Korea. The required further work should be done on the basis 
of an econometric analysis of a larger sample. 
                                                 
4
 The “structural bonus and burden” hypothesis were examined on example of Asian economies by 
Timmer and Szirmai (2000), on a large sample of OECD and developing countries (Fagerberg, 2000), 
and more recently by Peneder for USA, Japan and EU member states (Peneder, 2003) and by Havlik 
(2013) for CEE countries. Based on a structural decomposition, de Vries (2011) find that for China, 
India and Russia reallocation of labour across sectors is contributing to aggregate productivity growth, 
whereas in Brazil it is not. This strengthens the findings of McMillan and Rodrik (2011). 
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1. Results of Productivity Decomposition 
 
The most general measure in cross-country comparison of productivity levels is GDP 
per capita. However, this figure is significantly dependent on the employment rate 
and the average annual hours worked. Table 1 shows a comparison of Korea and 
Estonia with respect to U.S. 
 
Table 1. Productivity levels of Korea and Estonia in 2011 (U.S. = 100) 
 
Country GDP per capita GDP per hour 
worked 
Hours worked per capita 
Estonia 46 43 106 
Korea 63 49 128 
Source: OECD 
 
 
As GDP per capita accounts for 63% of the U.S. level in Korea and 46% in Estonia, 
the rate of GDP per hour worked is somewhat lower – 49% and 43% respectively. 
This indicates that the intensity of labour utilization in Estonia and Korea is higher 
than in the U.S. The number of hours worked per capita makes up 103% of the U.S. 
level in Estonia and 128% in Korea. Higher intensity of labour utilization in Estonia 
and especially in Korea is the basis for considerable discrepancies between the rati-
os of GDP per capita and GDP per hour worked compared to the U.S. With regard to 
the comparison between Estonia and Korea, the hourly productivity in Korea exceeds 
Estonian level by a narrow 15%, whereas on a per capita basis, the Korean ad-
vantage is around 38%. This particular feature will be the object of interest in the pre-
sent work and the basis for the decomposition. 
 
Before focusing on the results of the decomposition analysis, we will explain in a bit 
more detail the differences in the employment and productivity of Estonia and Korea 
at the relatively aggregated level of NACE classification (14 activities, which we call 
the economic sectors). 
 
In both countries, the largest share of employment is in the manufacturing sector, as 
in Estonia the share is over 20% and in Korea a bit less (Table 2). In terms of em-
ployment share, energy and water management, construction, transportation and 
communications and the public sector are also of high importance in Estonia. In Ko-
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rea, by contrast, the share of labour employed in finance, trade, in other services and 
in agriculture exceeds the corresponding levels of Estonia. To understand the rele-
vance of these differences in employment structure on average productivity, it is rele-
vant to briefly examine the sectoral productivity levels. At first, we consider the so-
called relative productivity, which is obtained by dividing the share of the value added 
of the sector with the corresponding employment share. The result is the reference 
coefficients, which describe the productivity of the particular sector with respect to the 
average sector or nation’s average. 
 
Table 2. The sectoral structure of employment and value added and relative productivity  
indexes of Korea and Estonia in 2006 (%) 
 
 
Employment 
share 
Share of value 
added 
Relative productivity 
index 
Korea Estonia Korea 
Esto-
nia Korea Estonia 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 
and fishing  7.7 5.0 3.2 3.2 41.0 63.5 
Mining and quarrying 0.1 0.8 0.2 1.0 303.3 119.5 
Manufacturing 18.0 21.1 27.5 17.0 152.5 80.7 
Electricity, gas and water 
supply 0.3 1.9 2.3 3.1 692.4 159.1 
Construction 7.9 9.7 7.5 8.7 95.0 89.5 
Wholesale and retail trade – 
repairs 16.0 13.7 8.7 14.5 54.0 105.8 
Hotels and restaurants 8.9 3.5 2.4 1.7 27.0 48.8 
Transport, storage and 
communication 6.4 9.5 6.8 11.1 107.1 117.0 
Financial intermediation 3.4 1.1 6.8 4.0 199.6 351.3 
Real estate, renting and 
business activities 9.4 7.4 14.6 20.1 155.9 270.4 
Public admin. and defence - 
compulsory social security 3.5 6.0 6.4 5.2 185.3 85.5 
Education 7.2 9.1 6.3 4.2 87.5 46.8 
Health and social work 3.0 5.8 3.9 3.0 131.0 51.7 
Other community, social 
and personal services 8.3 5.3 3.5 3.3 42.7 61.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 * * 
Source: OECD 
 
 
Although, the relative productivity indexes of the two countries are moderately corre-
lated (r=0.3), which refer to the rather similar general tendencies, some significant 
differences occur. Productivity levels in Korean electricity, gas and water supply sec-
tor and in mining significantly exceed the average levels in Korea (nearly seven and 
three times respectively). Financial intermediation and business services are approx-
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imately in the same role in Estonia with over 2.5 times higher productivity compared 
to the Estonia’s average and also exceeding the corresponding levels of Korea. The-
se are the regularities we have also observed in a previous study (Sepp et al 2009) - 
in transition economies the financial sector is relatively more profitable than in older 
market economies. The same applies for the real estate, renting and business activi-
ties. In both countries, the share of agriculture, hotels and restaurants and other 
community, social and personal services in total value added is relatively small. 
However, in Korea these sectors are of particularly low return compared to an aver-
age. The striking difference between Korea and Estonia appears on public sector 
figures. Three public sector branches included in the analysis comprise 13.7% of the 
employment in Korea, meanwhile as much as 20.9% in Estonia. In terms of value 
added the share of public sector accounts for 16.8% of total economy in Korea and 
12.4% in Estonia. In other words, the productivity of a single employee of the public 
sector of Korea exceeds the national average. In Estonia, however, the correspond-
ing level is only about 60% of the average. As a whole, the sectoral productivity varia-
tion in Korea is considerably higher than in Estonia. 
 
It is also remarkable that due to the higher relative productivity, manufacturing sector 
in Korea accounts for more than 27% of the total value added. In Estonia the relative 
productivity of manufacturing sector remained below the nation’s average, and there-
fore the contribution to overall value-added was smaller compared to the employment 
share. 
 
We take cognizance of these notable disparities and now focus on productivity de-
composition. We use the same productivity (GDP per capita) gap notation, which ac-
cording to the Table 1 is 38% between Korea and Estonia. 
 
This gap could be decomposed into three components as follows: 
t-1 = Σse*(qk-qe) + Σ(t*sk-se)*qe + Σ(t*sk-se)*(qk-qe),    (1) 
where 
t - the ratio of the average productivity in Korea and Estonia; 
t-1 - the average productivity gap between Korea and Estonia; 
qk and qe – share of industry in total employment in Korea and Estonia (Table 2); 
sk and se - the relative productivity of industry in Korea and Estonia (Table 2). 
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With using the multiplier t we can switch from relative productivity deviations to the 
actual deviations adjusted with the average productivity levels (Table 3). It appears 
that in as many as six sectors, the productivity in Korea lags Estonian levels. The 
largest backlog exists in the wholesale and retail trade – around 30%. However, the 
real productivity in Korean electricity, gas and water supply sector exceeds the corre-
sponding level of Estonia almost six times, the difference is 3.5 to 2.6 times in mining 
and manufacturing. Korea has also about three times higher productivity in the public 
sector. Essentially, the latter means better financing. 
 
Table 3. Relative and real sectoral productivity deviations and reference coefficients of Korea 
compared to Estonia in 2006 (%) 
 
  
  
Productivity deviations Reference 
coefficient 
Relative  Real 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing  -22.5 -6.8 89 
Mining and quarrying 183.8 299.3 350 
Manufacturing 71.8 129.9 261 
Electricity, gas and water supply 533.3 797.0 601 
Construction 5.5 41.7 147 
Wholesale and retail trade – repairs -51.8 -31.2 70 
Hotels and restaurants -21.8 -11.5 76 
Transport, storage and communication -9.9 30.9 126 
Financial intermediation -151.7 -75.7 78 
Real estate, renting and business activities -114.5 -55.1 80 
Public admin. and defence, social security 99.8 170.4 299 
Education 40.7 74.1 258 
Health and social work 79.4 129.3 350 
Other community, social and personal 
services 
-19.1 -2.9 95 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
 
In equation 1, the first component describes the effect of the differences in the sec-
toral structure of employment, the second component describes differences due to 
the inter-industry productivity differences and the third component represents the 
cross effect of first two components. The formation of these individual components is 
shown in Table 4. Sectoral productivity differences in manufacturing clearly play the 
largest role in Korean-Estonian productivity gap. Assuming equal productivity levels 
in the other economic sectors, the productivity gap between Korea and Estonia would 
 10 
be 27.3% due to the manufacturing sector only. Therefore, we will explore the impact 
of manufacturing in more detail below. Productivity discrepancies in energy and water 
management sector increase the overall productivity gap by another 15.3%. Howev-
er, the third component of the decomposition, the cross effect, reduces that margin 
by 12.7%, which means that higher productivity in Korea has concurred with lower 
share of employment. In terms of structural differences (between effect), the contribu-
tion of the financial intermediation to the productivity gap is the largest with 8%.  
 
Table  4. Decomposition of productivity gap across sectors 
 
  
Structural 
difference 
Productivity 
difference 
Cross 
effect Total 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing  1.7 -0.3 -0.2 1.2 
Mining and quarrying -0.9 2.4 -2.2 -0.6 
Manufacturing -2.5 27.4 -4.0 20.9 
Electricity, gas and water supply -2.5 15.3 -12.7 0.1 
Construction -1.6 4.0 -0.7 1.7 
Wholesale and retail trade - repairs 2.4 -4.3 -0.7 -2.6 
Hotels and restaurants 2.6 -0.4 -0.6 1.6 
Transport, storage and communication -3.7 2.9 -1.0 -1.7 
Financial intermediation 8.0 -0.9 -1.7 5.4 
Real estate, renting and business activi-
ties 5.2 -4.1 -1.1 0.0 
Public admin. and defence, social security -2.2 10.3 -4.4 3.7 
Education -0.9 6.7 -1.4 4.4 
Health and social work -1.5 7.5 -3.7 2.4 
Other community, social and personal 
services 1.8 -0.2 -0.1 1.6 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
 
The summary results of the decomposition analysis are presented in Table 5. The 
important finding of our analysis is that the discrepancies in productivity levels of indi-
vidual sectors play the dominant role on productivity gap formation between Korea 
and Estonia as these discrepancies account for 66%. Fortunate for Estonia, the in-
teraction or cross effect of productivity and structural differences is clearly negative 
(correlation coefficient about -0.4), which indicates a structural burden exist. Signifi-
cantly higher productivity levels in some sectors of the Korean economy are mostly 
related to the smaller share of employment compared to Estonia. In this particular 
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case, the structural and productivity difference components have the opposite signs 
in every single sector (Table 4). Consequently, the within-component of the produc-
tivity gap between Korea and Estonia would be 32% if the calculations are based on 
the structure of employment in Korea instead of Estonia. 
 
Table 5. Components of productivity gap 2006 (%) 
 
 Structural difference Productivity difference Cross effect Total 
Effect 6 66 -34 38 
Percentage 16 175 -90 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
The net effect of pure structural transformations is rather modest (16% of the total 
productivity gap), but still important. However, the between-component of the de-
composition becomes negative (-28%) if we use the productivity levels of Korea as 
the basis of our calculations. Hence, the crowding-out hypothesis is confirmed in our 
analysis at the sectoral level. An interesting notion is that in Korea, alongside manu-
facturing and energy sector with ultra-high productivity levels, relatively large share of 
people are employed in low productivity agriculture, trade, hotels and restaurants. 
 
2. Decomposition of Manufacturing Sector Productivity 
 
Whereas the conception that positive deviations of productivity levels between coun-
tries tend to result in negative deviations in employment structure at aggregate level 
is generally accepted, the contributions, linkages and connections of the individual 
branches are not enough studied in order to talk about general knowledge, even at 
the empirical level. In the following paragraphs we analyse these branch-level rela-
tions taking manufacturing sector as an example. We compare Korean and Estonian 
manufacturing sectors using a STAN database of 12 manufacturing industries (Table 
6). 
 
A number of differences, even larger than at sectoral level, occur between Korean 
and Estonian economy. Whereas Korea has virtually no forest and wood industry, in 
Estonia it is the second important manufacturing branch in terms of employment 
share (behind the textile industry). In contrast, Estonia has not had much of the me-
chanical engineering industry compared to Korea. Three branches of the mechanical 
engineering industry included in the analysis account for only 15.8% of total employ-
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ment in Estonia, while in Korea the corresponding figure is as high as 46.4%! Korea 
has also relatively higher employment share in the chemical industry.  
 
Table 6. Employment, value added and relative productivity in different branches of manu-
facturing sector of Korea and Estonia in 2006 (%) 
 
  
Employment Productivity 
Relative  
productivity 
Korea Estonia Korea Estonia Korea Estonia 
Food products, beverages and 
tobacco 6.5 11.7 5.0 12.5 78.1 106.6 
Textiles and textile products 8.8 16.9 4.3 8.3 49.6 49.2 
Leather, leather products and 
footwear 1.0 1.5 0.5 0.6 45.2 43.2 
Wood and products of wood 
and cork 0.9 15.8 0.5 13.8 58.2 87.2 
Pulp, paper, paper products, 
printing and publishing 5.5 5.8 4.1 7.7 74.7 133.0 
Chemical, rubber, plastics and 
fuel products 12.0 5.9 16.3 10.4 136.1 174.8 
Other non-metallic mineral 
products 3.0 4.0 3.3 8.8 111.7 223.0 
Basic metals and fabricated 
metal products 13.0 12.2 15.8 10.3 121.9 84.5 
Machinery and equipment, 
n.e.c. 11.6 2.8 9.4 4.7 81.3 167.3 
Electrical and optical equip-
ment 21.6 8.2 24.3 11.1 112.8 134.7 
Transport equipment 13.2 4.8 14.7 4.2 110.8 88.7 
Manufacturing n.e.c. and recy-
cling 3.0 10.4 1.7 7.6 54.9 72.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 * * 
 
Source: OECD and authors’ calculations 
 
 
In addition to the review of employment shares, it is relevant to examine the relative 
productivity levels of different manufacturing branches. Interestingly, the differences 
within the manufacturing sector do not appear to be as large as the differences at the 
sectoral level. Correlations between the productivity levels of the two countries 
(around 0.6) are significantly stronger here, compared to correlations between the 
aggregated sectors. Hence, the manufacturing branches with higher and lower level 
of productivity coincide rather well. In both countries, productivity levels are the low-
est in the textile and leather industries with relative productivity less than half the av-
erage of manufacturing sector. Chemical industry and machinery can be regarded as 
the branches with the highest productivity. 
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If at the sectoral level the variability in productivity was greater in Korea, then in man-
ufacturing industry it is larger in the context of Estonia. This is in line with the hypoth-
esis of McMillan and Rodrik (2011) that the lower variability in productivity levels is a 
characteristic feature of higher level of development of the state. 
 
We should not forget that on average Korean manufacturing sector was 2.61 times 
more productive than Estonian. Taking that in account, we have calculated the real 
deviations of productivity in addition to relative ones (Table 7). It turns out that in all of 
the manufacturing branches, the productivity in Korea is higher compared to Estonia. 
The largest discrepancies in favour of Korea stand in metalworking industry and in 
the manufacturing of transport equipment, particularly the automotive industry, where 
the productivity exceeds Estonian level by more than three times. The smallest gap 
between Korea and Estonia occurs in the industries of non-metallic mineral products 
and machinery and equipment wherein Korea has the lead of about 30%. 
 
Table 7. Deviations of the relative and real productivity in branches of manufacturing industry 
in 2006 (%) 
 
  
Productivity deviations 
Reference 
coefficient Relative Real 
Food products, beverages and tobacco -28.4 97.1 191.1 
Textiles and textile products 0.4 80.0 262.6 
Leather, leather products and footwear 2.0 74.7 272.8 
Wood and products of wood and cork -29.0 64.5 174.0 
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing -58.3 61.7 146.4 
Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel products -38.6 180.1 203.1 
Other non-metallic mineral products -111.3 68.1 130.5 
Basic metals and fabricated metal products 37.4 233.2 376.0 
Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. -86.0 44.6 126.7 
Electrical and optical equipment -22.0 159.3 218.2 
Transport equipment 22.1 200.1 325.5 
Manufacturing n.e.c. and recycling -17.7 70.5 197.1 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
Subsequently, the decomposition analysis is applied for examining the impact and 
contribution of individual branches on the formation of manufacturing productivity gap 
(161%). 
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Table 8. Decomposition of productivity gap across manufacturing branches 
 
  
Structural 
difference 
Productivity 
difference 
Cross 
effect Total 
Food products, beverages and tobacco -5.6 11.4 -5.1 0.6 
Textiles and textile products -4.0 13.5 -6.5 3.0 
Leather, leather products and footwear -0.2 1.1 -0.3 0.6 
Wood and products of wood and cork -13.0 10.2 -9.6 -12.4 
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing 
and publishing -0.4 3.6 -0.2 2.9 
Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel 
products 10.6 10.7 10.9 32.2 
Other non-metallic mineral products -2.2 2.7 -0.7 -0.1 
Basic metals and fabricated metal 
products 0.6 28.6 1.7 30.9 
Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 14.7 1.2 3.9 19.9 
Electrical and optical equipment 18.0 13.1 21.3 52.3 
Transport equipment 7.5 9.5 16.9 34.0 
Manufacturing n.e.c. and recycling -5.3 7.3 -5.2 -3.2 
Source: Authors' calculations 
 
 
It is particularly noteworthy that in a number of major manufacturing branches of Ko-
rea, the structural and productivity effects are both positive and together shape a 
positive cross effect. The industry with the largest contribution to the manufacturing 
sector productivity gap is electrical equipment. It is followed by manufacturing of 
transport equipment, metalworking and manufacturing of chemical products with 
more or less equal contribution to the productivity gap. The only industry that contrib-
utes to the reduction of the productivity gap is forest and wood industry, particularly 
through the higher share of employment in Estonia. The summary results of industry 
level decomposition are represented in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Components of productivity gap in manufacturing sector in 2006 (%) 
 
 
Structural difference Productivity difference Cross effect Total 
Effect 21 113 27 161 
Percentage 13 70 17 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
The importance of different components in explaining the productivity gap in manu-
facturing sector is rather different compared to the component structure in a more 
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aggregated sectoral level. The positive cross effect should be noted in particular, 
which means that in the manufacturing sector, the increase in productivity does not 
necessarily mean a crowding out of labour, but rather the opposite – the attraction of 
labour. The structural bonus hypothesis finds some support in Korea – the employ-
ment has shifted towards the most successful industries. However, the within com-
ponent still accounts the largest share (70%) of manufacturing sector productivity 
gap. About 30% of Estonia’s backlog in manufacturing sector could be accounted for 
differences in employment structure if the calculations are based on the productivity 
levels of Korea. This result is consistent with our previous study, in which the struc-
tural bonus accounted for approximately 20% of the productivity gap between Esto-
nian manufacturing compared to Finnish and EU average and as much as 40% com-
pared to Ireland (Sepp, Eerma 2009). 
 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
 
The decomposition of the productivity gap between Korea and Estonia lead us to the 
following conclusions: 
1. The impact of the employment structure on average productivity varies on differ-
ent structural levels. Whereas at more aggregated sectoral level the structural 
burden hypothesis was confirmed, in less aggregated level – taking manufactur-
ing industry in our study – the structural bonus prevailed. In the first case, high 
level of productivity was accompanied with decreasing share of employment. In 
the second case, contrarily, the labour was converging to the manufacturing 
branches with higher productivity. It needs a further research, whether it is a ran-
dom structural specificity or a regular legitimacy. 
2. At aggregated sectoral perspective, Korea lags Estonian productivity levels in 
several areas, particularly in traditional private sector services (trade, hotels and 
restaurants etc.) and the overall productivity gap (38%) is mainly related to the 
manufacturing industry. Significant sectoral variations in productivity can be con-
sidered as one of the weaknesses of the Korean economy. 
3. In accordance with the previous studies, the relatively high productivity in finan-
cial intermediation and real estate sector in the young market economies was 
confirmed. 
 16 
4. The situation in the public sector is substantially different in those two countries. 
Korea is characterized by a relatively low public sector employment share, but 
significantly higher productivity or the funding compared to Estonia. 
5. In manufacturing sector, the average productivity in Korea is 2.6 times higher 
compared to Estonia and unlike the more aggregated sectoral level, it concerns 
all the manufacturing branches. Electronics and manufacturing of transport 
equipment are playing the most important role in formation of the productivity 
gap. Considering both productivity, employment and their interaction, there is just 
one branch in Estonian manufacturing industry that somewhat mitigates the 
productivity gap – the wood and forest industry. 
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